

**RISSB**

RAIL INDUSTRY SAFETY AND STANDARDS BOARD

**CODE OF PRACTICE**

# **Risk Management for Driver Only Operation**

COP DOCUMENT REVIEW ONLY

This Rail Industry Safety and Standards Board (RISSB) product has been developed using input from rail experts from across the Rail Industry. RISSB wishes to acknowledge the positive contribution of all subject matter experts and development group representatives who participated in the development of this product.

The RISSB Development Group for this Code of Practice consisted of representatives from the following organizations:


ARTC Inland Rail  
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Rail Management Australia  
Rio Tinto

Rail Tram and Bus Union  
TfNSW

Development of this Code of Practice was undertaken in accordance with RISSB's accredited processes. It was approved by the Development Group, endorsed by the Safety and Operations Standing Committee, and approved for publication by the RISSB Board.

I commend this Code of Practice to the Australasian rail industry as it represents industry good practice and has been developed through a rigorous process.



**Damien White**  
Chief Executive Officer  
Rail Industry Safety and Standards Board

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### Notice to users

This RISSB product has been developed using input from rail experts from across the rail industry and represents good practice for the industry. The reliance upon or manner of use of this RISSB product is the sole responsibility of the user who is to assess whether it meets their organization's operational environment and risk profile.

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## Background

In Australia, rail traffic can be managed by two crew members in various combinations, or as driver only operations. Two person operations can be a driver and a second person located in the driving cabin or on the rail traffic. The second person may be another driver, an assistant driver, a guard, or other competent workers. While with driver only operation (DOO), the driver is solely responsible for all rail traffic management activities.

## Objective

This document aims to provide guidance on how hazards and risks associated with DOO are identified, assessed and considered in the context of the particular Rail Transport Operator (RTO) operations and accreditation to manage the hazards safe so far as is reasonably practicable (SFAIRP).

COP DOO PREVIEW ONLY

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## Section 1 Scope and general

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### 1.1 Scope

The scope of this Code of Practice includes the requirement for an RTO to demonstrate due diligence in developing and applying a risk methodology that confirms DOO is safe SFAIRP. The risk methodology shall be applied before the introduction of driver only operations or before the removal of the second person on freight, heavy and light rail passenger services and infrastructure maintenance vehicles operating on the network.

This document does not specifically cover, autonomous train operations (GoA3 and GoA4), or heritage railways on private or isolated tracks. However, relevant items from this Code of Practice may be applied by the RTO as appropriate.

Similarly, while infrastructure maintenance vehicles operating in multiple with the competent worker managing safeworking on a remote or other vehicle, the RTO should apply aspects of this code as applicable.

This document does not address technical steps/aspects of achieving DOO; The actual quantification of risk (assuming any accredited Australian railway will have a satisfactory method and schema for the determination of risk, be it qualitative or quantitative), or the assumption of any specific risk philosophy such as those espoused by ISO 31000, *Risk Management – Guidelines*.

### 1.2 References

Documents for informative purposes are listed in a Bibliography at the back of the Standard.

### 1.3 Defined terms and abbreviations

For the purposes of this document, the following terms and definitions apply:

#### 1.3.1

##### **ATP**

automatic train protection

#### 1.3.2

##### **assistant driver**

authorized assistant (not a driver) who is within the rail traffic cab and has associated responsibilities and duties

#### 1.3.3

##### **driver only operations (DOO)**

operation of a rail traffic by a driver without another driver or other person in the driver's cabin or rail traffic who is qualified in, and has suitable experience in, the operation of the rollingstock and the safe working system that form part of the network rules

#### 1.3.4

##### **ETCS**

European Train Control System

#### 1.3.5

##### **guard**

qualified worker on a passenger train who carries out safeworking duties and is responsible for the safety and supervision of passengers

#### 1.3.6

##### **second person**

qualified worker on the rail traffic to assist the driver in operational tasks